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1  Introduction
In Legitimation by Procedure Luhmann ([1969] 1989: 196) addresses a major 
problem of democratic theory by asserting: “The majority principle is not a way 
of legitimation, rather it is a stopgap”.1 Its primary feature is practicality, which 
** Originally published as Glassmann, Ulrich und Sauermann, Jan: “Entscheidungskosten und 
Gemeinwohleffekte demokratischer Abstimmungsregeln – eine experimentelle Untersuchung” 
in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS), Vol. 52 (2011), Nr. 3, p. 373–398. The original  
publication is available at www.pvs.nomos.de. Reprinted with permission from German  
Political Science Association and Nomos.
1 The original German title of Luhmann’s book, which is the version from which we quote, is 
Legitimation durch Verfahren. Translations by the authors.
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is why simple majority rule is viewed as the most efficient procedure of political 
decision-making in established democracies (Guttman 1998: 190). Nevertheless, 
majority rule is not easy to justify, given its exclusionary effects. A loophole is 
seen in the assumption that the rule is only supposed to guarantee that everyone 
in the electorate receives a fair opportunity to enforce her preferences by majority 
vote every time a new ballot is held; thus it may be considered sufficient if the 
individual voter only occasionally profits from the rule. However, this perspective 
does not diminish the complication that minority rights cannot readily be pro-
tected by the majority principle. Because of this, unanimity rule is consistently 
regarded as the more legitimate variant of democratic voting procedures, as it 
grants individual veto power to all participating actors (Buchanan and Tullock 
[1962] 1999). From another perspective, the veto option means that the larger 
groups become, the more rewarding strategic behavior appears. This escalates 
decision costs and leads to deadlock situations. Although unanimity played an 
important role in Europe’s pre-democratic era (von Gierke 1915; Heinberg 1932: 
454–456), it has become marginalized in modern democratic voting procedures 
because of this effect. Even in consensus democracies, most decisions are taken 
by majority votes. Accordingly, Lijphart explains: “Consensualists can argue that 
they are not against majority rule as such but that they favor broad instead of 
narrow majority rule” (Lijphart 2008: 126).
However, theoretical analyses of decision rules uphold the unanimity prin-
ciple despite its low practicality: in comparison to majority rule it is believed to 
produce better welfare effects (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 1999: 85–96). Results 
from empirical case studies (Conrad 2003) and diverging model assumptions 
(Guttman 1998; critical on this Buchanan 1998; Arrow 1998), however, cause disa-
greement on the actual occurrence of these positive welfare effects. In this study 
we seek to gain more clarity on this matter. Our research question can be framed 
as follows: What decision costs and which welfare effects evolve under majoritar-
ian and unanimous democratic voting rules?
The theoretical starting point of this analysis derives from the ideas of Wick-
sell (1896) on the unanimity principle, and especially from the public choice 
model based on Wicksell’s considerations developed by Buchanan and Tullock 
([1962] 1999). According to this, the decision costs and welfare effects induced by 
voting rules constitute a trade-off relation. By means of a laboratory experiment, 
we demonstrate empirically that this assumed trade-off is not inevitable. We will 
further elaborate the implications of this finding for democratic theory, in par-
ticular the legitimacy of the majority principle.
If the influence of decision rules is to be scrutinized more reliably than by case 
study design, data on individual behavior are needed. Although not very common in 
German political science, an experimental research design seems most appropriate 
Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules   161
for such an analysis. Accordingly, we shall discuss how experiments can be carried 
out in political science and what specific value this method adds to our research.
We begin by examining classical perspectives on the problem as they have 
been elaborated in decision theory and democratic theory. In this context we will 
sketch out our own theoretical assumptions. Next, we outline the experimental 
method and our own experimental design and results. Finally, we will draw some 
theoretical conclusions from our findings. Full details of the experiment (instruc-
tions for subjects deciding under majority rule) are presented in an online appen-
dix to this article.2
2  Theoretical Discussion and Main Thesis
The main thesis of this study is that under specific conditions (defined below) 
majority rule causes both better welfare effects and lower decision costs than 
unanimity rule, which is why the two decision rules do not necessarily constitute 
a trade-off relation. It is therefore sustainable to restrict the assumption of the 
unanimity rule as the norm (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 1999: 96) and to legiti-
mate majority rule in ways different from the argument which draws exclusively 
on its efficiency with respect to decision costs.
2.1   Theoretical Arguments from Decision Theory  
on Democratic Voting Rules
The argument in decision theory, according to which unanimous decision proce-
dures create better welfare effects than majoritarian procedures, was originally 
elaborated by Knut Wicksell, whose Studies in the Theory of Public Finance (1896) is 
concerned with just taxation. Wicksell starts with the assumption that tax payment 
and the provision of public goods can be described as a barter transaction between 
citizens and the state. Each tax payment should therefore be minimally equiva-
lent to the benefit from the resulting public policy. Historically, this assumption 
was motivated by the observation that the representation of the working class, if it 
existed at all, was quite low in European parliaments at the end of the 19th century:
“it may therefore easily happen … that those decisions [of the parliamentary majority], even 
if universal suffrage exists, will not express the will of a majority of the population; and 
2 The appendix can be downloaded at www.pvs.nomos.de
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that, of course, must be even more the case, where law making and tax approval (as with 
us in Sweden) rest exclusively in the hands of the propertied classes” (Wicksell 1896: 109).3
This under-representation of the working class brought about a discriminatory 
tax policy, because elected delegates voted to advantage a class-specific clien-
tele. Thus indirect taxes were particularly high in Sweden at this period, causing 
a disproportional strain on lower-income groups. Hence even increasing direct 
taxation could not bring them sufficient relief.
Wicksell concludes that parliamentary procedures for tax approval would 
only generate a just distribution of taxation: if universal suffrage were intro-
duced; if members of parliament were elected by a proportional electoral system; 
and if they voted under “relative unanimity” (Wicksell 1896: 122–123). In fact, this 
decision rule is equivalent to qualified majority rule; nevertheless, Wicksell calls 
it unanimity in order to stress that from a theoretical view it would create greater 
benefits, and that deviations should be only for reasons of practicality.
His argument on voting rules is therefore not only derived from the historical 
representation of lower-income groups (which can change over time anyway), 
but is based on the theoretical idea that just taxation cannot be sufficiently 
secured by a certain degree of progressive taxation. Instead, he sees just taxation 
as being dependent on democratic procedures. Because progressive taxation 
does not determine which particular public goods are provided in what quan-
tity (Wicksell 1896: 104, 106), citizens’ benefits from taxes remain undefined. 
However, individual, or at least class-specific, preferences would be taken into 
account in the distribution of the tax burden, if individual veto rights existed. 
This rule would ensure that “everyone benefits” from the exchange (Wicksell 
1896: 113): individuals would only be made better off if this would put no one 
else in a worse position. From this perspective, unanimity rule leads to a Pareto-
efficient solution in tax policy, and more generally, in the provision of public 
goods. This basic idea led to the assumption in decision theory that unanim-
ity rule creates better welfare effects than majority rule. Wicksell in fact denied 
such a relation between unanimity rule and the Pareto-criterion, but subsequent 
scholars agree that Wicksell’s general critique of the Pareto-criterion results from 
a misconception on his part, influenced by the ideological distance between his 
theory on welfare and Paretian economics; today the Pareto-criterion and the 
unanimity principle are viewed as being logically equivalent (Hennipman 1980, 
1982: 55–57).
3 The quote is from the German version of Studies in the Theory of Public Finance entitled 
Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen. Translations by the authors.
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In their major contribution to public choice theory, The Calculus of Consent, 
Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) emphatically pointed to this logical equiv-
alence. However, unlike Wicksell’s analysis, theirs is not restricted to a certain 
policy. It more generally asks which public decision-making structures may 
legitimately replace private agreements. Their concept thus lies in the tradition of 
the classical theories of social contracts (Locke [1690] 1977;  Hobbes [1651] 1996); 
within it, however, decision rules are of major importance.
Buchanan and Tullock assume a two-tiered system of rules for a democratic 
political system: 1) on the constitutional level, decisions about the rules on which 
society is based should be taken by unanimity; 2) on the level of “everyday politics” 
voters should only deviate from unanimity as dictated by decision costs. Unlike 
classical theories of social contracts, no normative objectives or at least fairness 
aspects (Rawls 1975) are developed beyond this system of rules which could guide 
the contractors. The contract is presented less as an historical thought-experi-
ment (Kersting 1994) than as a real declaration of consent between economically 
and socially unequal subjects. Its conservative impact probably originated from 
the authors’ ideological convictions, but is far from being a negligible detail of 
their study. It matches their assumption on methodological individualism and 
the idea that individual freedom needs to be protected categorically when collec-
tive decisions are taken.
Even if collective agreements enable individuals to experience the well-
ordered supply of certain public goods, Buchanan and Tullock consider it 
mistaken to enforce participation in investment for their provision without 
individual consent. Because individual preferences may differ with respect 
to both ordering and intensity (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 1999: 125–131), 
individual benefits from the supply of public goods will always diverge. Con-
sequently, an interpersonal utility comparison seems to be impossible to 
achieve. In line with this argument, it appears quite futile to search for an 
objective criterion determining common welfare; this serves to reveal the con-
sistent procedural logic of the model.
While Arrow (1963) continued to explore the conditions of possibility for a 
social welfare function, Buchanan and Tullock completely deny the possibility 
of such a function under any condition, defending this premise as an important 
liberal element in their theory (Petersen 1996: 62–63). To acknowledge allegedly 
objective common welfare, they plead, would only allow authoritarian coalitions 
to impose their special interests on the community (Buchanan [1975] 1984: 233). 
Majority rule would probably assist such forces in their usurpation and could 
thus deploy features of tyranny.
In contrast to a concept which is centered on allegedly objective common 
welfare, Buchanan and Tullock view the Pareto-criterion as an alternative 
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principle of justice. They present the unanimity rule as a practical rule of enforce-
ment. Petersen (1996: 88) examines “the actual innovation of the ‘Calculus of 
Consent’” in the theoretical conjunction between unanimity rule, Pareto-crite-
rion, and a “subjective concept of benefit”. Nevertheless, even in this study the 
unanimity rule serves rather as an orientation to enable the determination of an 
optimal decision rule applicable under practical considerations. Such an optimal 
decision rule for everyday politics appears ascertainable, according to Buchanan 
and Tullock, by discounting the welfare effects induced by the decision rule 
from the decision costs in an economic cost-benefit analysis (Kaiser 2007). In 
this respect the approach embodies a consequential expansion of the economic 
theory of democracy (Downs 1957).
This discounting procedure is based on the further assumption that welfare 
effects and decision costs are inversely proportional interdependent; they are 
therefore called interdependence costs.4 This trade-off, amongst others, emerges 
because private proprietors often create costs for third parties. For instance, 
private enterprises may pollute the environment and displace ensuing costs to 
communes and their private households.5 To reduce external costs the actors 
involved may come to a voluntary collective agreement or else delegate this task 
to the state, for instance by a legal commitment on standards for environmen-
tal protection. Even these agreements or laws may cause external costs; but the 
more actors involved in deciding the final collective regulation the lower the 
costs (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 1999: 64–68). A dictator is likely to create 
the highest external costs for the population, while the inclusion of all citizens 
reduces external costs to zero, as individuals would not consent to a binding 
agreement which would disproportionately shift external costs to them.
Majority rule cannot guarantee to avoid such unequal distributions of costs. 
For instance, some communes could agree by majority vote to build a wastewater 
4 In their study Buchanan and Tullock use the following terms: on the one hand they talk about 
decision costs and on the other about external costs, arguing that both constitute a trade-off 
relation. We adopted the term decision costs. However, we only talk about external costs, if we 
express the outcome of a collective decision negatively. In contrast we use the terms common 
welfare or welfare effects, if we express this outcome positively. As we are interested in the 
conditions under which groups show a stronger tendency to cooperate (thus creating larger 
welfare) we mostly use the terms common welfare or welfare effects. Only in this paragraph 
we use the term external costs to clarify that our considerations are analogous to those by 
Buchanan and Tullock.
5 The environmental policy example is given to illustrate a certain dilemma situation. In their 
study Buchanan and Tullock refer to problems in health policies. The two examples are actually 
exchangeable – for our purposes the less complex example of environmental policy is more 
appropriate.
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treatment plant to clean a polluted river in their area. No one would deny the 
common welfare resulting from this measure. However, such plants can create 
quite considerable noise disturbance and odor nuisance for residents nearby. 
Under majority rule little attention would be paid to such effects and conse-
quently, some residents would be forced to shoulder the burden of these external 
costs alone – a Pareto-inefficient solution. Under unanimity rule the plant would 
only be built where it would cause no disturbance to anyone in the communes 
concerned.
According to this public choice argument, deviation from the norm of una-
nimity can only be legitimized if it minimizes interdependence costs (Buchanan 
[1975] 1984: 138), so that ballots are held as inclusively as possible (welfare) and 
as exclusively as necessary (decision costs). Practically, this legitimizes major-
ity rule as the most efficient decision rule, but with respect to welfare gains ori-
ented towards the Pareto-criterion, it remains a stopgap. Wicksell defined this 
deviation in a rather indeterminate fashion, by introducing the principle of “rela-
tive unanimity”. In contrast, the concept of interdependence costs presented by 
Buchanan and Tullock constitutes a clear-cut theoretical account to determine a 
“good” (efficient) decision rule which, however, entirely omits a substantial iden-
tification of common welfare.
Nevertheless, from our point of view, this strong procedural logic leads to 
major difficulties of justification in democratic theory. Moreover, we assume 
that only the introduction of a minimalist criterion for the evaluation of welfare 
effects will show that not unanimity rule but majority rule will produce more con-
vincing results. This cannot be valid for each and every case. For our analysis it 
will be entirely sufficient to present a case in which the interdependence rela-
tion mentioned above does not exist. From our perspective, such a case appears 
conceivable, because unanimity rule is theoretically indeterminate with regard 
to its effects on welfare. In the next paragraph we sketch out the critique of this 
problem which has emerged in democratic theory. Subsequently, we will show 
that the results of our laboratory experiment support this critique empirically.
2.2   Theoretical Arguments from Democratic Theory  
on Democratic Voting Rules
The idea that unanimity rule can be regarded as a norm corresponds to the strong 
plea for the concept of consensus democracies as it has been developed in empiri-
cal research on democracies – although the organizational principle of this type of 
democracy is actually grounded on the qualified majority principle, as explained 
in the introduction. In response to the question, who is supposed to govern in 
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consensus democracies, Lijphart says: “as many people as possible” (Lijphart 
1999: 2). The main difference between the public choice model and Lijphart’s 
theoretical concept consists in the fact that the benefits of bargained decisions 
are not compared to their costs (Bohrer 2001). So the debates over which type of 
democracy is superior and over optimal decision rules do not exactly focus on 
identical problems. This does not come as a surprise, because empirical research 
on democracies pays more attention to the questions of whether decision rules 
are adequately designed to respond to a certain societal conflict structure and 
whether they produce efficient policy outcomes under these particular circum-
stances. This strand of literature does not offer a satisfying answer to the question 
of which decision rule promotes the more efficient results ceteris paribus.
In normative democratic theory and political philosophy, however, this ques-
tion has long been considered highly relevant (Dewey 1954; Sartori 1987; Haber-
mas 1992). Discussions in this field of research were often influenced by political 
and societal change in Western democracies. In the 1980s, for instance, some 
advocates of the peace and environmental movements expressed their doubts 
concerning the legitimacy of the majority rule, viewing it as enabling problematic 
decisions in energy and security policy, which in turn threatened the wellbeing of 
mankind (Guggenberger and Offe 1984).
Buchanan, too, was writing in reaction to the changing political climate of 
the USA during the 1960s and 1970s. He diagnosed a tendency towards excessive 
and ineffective public policies which had caused an enormous public debt. At the 
root of this crisis, Buchanan thought, lay an increasing dissolution of the func-
tional separation of powers promoted by a well-meaning elite. Judges in federal 
courts, for instance, made rulings “according to their own idealized convictions” 
(Buchanan [1975] 1984: 245), transgressing the borders of their judicial author-
ity. Thus the alleged implementation of an elitist agenda determining common 
welfare damaged democratic procedures.
The danger perceived by Buchanan had resulted from a normatively contest-
able mixture of two different fields of public activities: on the one hand, the state 
needs to guarantee legal protection; on the other, to provide public services. Legal 
norms designed to secure individual freedom should never be sacrificed for the 
provider state and should not be arbitrarily interpreted to implement ideas about 
common welfare, no matter how they were brought to mind. After all, citizens 
had not decided such matters unanimously, though they had to bear the costs of 
this extremely inefficient and expansive public financial conduct. This kind of 
public policy illegitimately restricted individual freedom. In contrast, unanimity 
is viewed as securing these constitutionally warranted individual rights.
Against this claim for a theoretical superiority of the unanimity rule, Kersting 
(1994) has raised some important objections, which are highly relevant for our 
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laboratory experiment and its underlying assumptions. The critique is twofold: 
first, he states that the argument based on contract theory would lead into a 
blind alley, because Buchanan and Tullock assumed a lifelike point of depar-
ture. While, for instance, the Hobbesian state of nature would not be character-
ized by asymmetrical threats, as Hobbes assumes that men are created equal by 
nature, Buchanan and Tullock’s public choice model rested on “down-to-earth” 
and therefore normatively unsubstantial assumptions about the pre-contractual 
situation. According to Buchanan and Tullock, human beings are unequally 
endowed with skills. This causes an unequal distribution of resources and prop-
erty, which would be contractually sealed on the basis of nothing but the involved 
actors’ individual preferences. In so far as the contract mirrors these preferences, 
it is considered to be just. Under these conditions, the critics say, a strong and 
aggressive actor would only engage in a contract if it guaranteed the retention of 
goods acquired in a pre-contractual situation, no matter how illegitimate their 
possession might appear under different principles of justice. A weaker and less 
aggressive actor, however, must fear the absence of collective agreements much 
more than her stronger counterpart. Under such conditions, a contract, even an 
oppressive one, which at least protects her from cruelty, will probably be accepted 
by the underdog (Kersting 1994: 343). A contract based on this public choice 
model must therefore be regarded as “immoral” from a normative point of view.
This leads to the second critique of Buchanan and Tullock’s approach: the 
allegation that the contractual concept, as well as the unanimity rule, would have 
to be regarded as an “empty criterion” (Kersting 1994: 349–351). The unanimity 
rule provides no criterion by which to determine how a group arrives at an agree-
ment to solve a specific collective action problem (Feldmann 1997: 524). This can 
be illustrated by returning once again to the example of the construction of a 
wastewater treatment plant: it is conceivable that the communes agree to build 
it where it can cause no disturbance to any of the residents. However, it is also 
conceivable that a single actor votes against it to save the costs, so that the river 
remains polluted. Buchanan and Tullock’s theory provides neither an external 
criterion of efficiency (a superior moral or economic category) which would allow 
us to measure welfare, nor any orientation for a specific policy solution: every-
thing depends on the preference of the most patient veto player. She may be a 
downright egoist or altruist – on the basis of the decision rule alone, however, any 
prediction about which actor comes out on top is completely impossible. Hence, 
it appears unclear how a cooperation dilemma will be resolved under unanimity, 
whether self-interested or shared objectives will be achieved.
One may argue that this critique assumes the possibility of measuring effi-
ciency externally, although the public choice model only focuses on the great-
est possible accordance between the interests of voters and the policy outcome. 
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As a matter of fact, one could respond to Kersting’s critique that it applies addi-
tional moral categories, which will not be shared by every individual actor. The 
indeterminacy of the unanimity rule may thus be welcomed rather than rejected 
by advocates of public choice theory. However, we assume that Kersting’s cri-
tique is essentially qualified. Certainly, any reference to external criteria such 
as fairness, or even policies such as a clean environment, renewable energy, 
economic equality and the like, may be rightly refused by the model’s advocates 
by pointing to the fact that individual preferences may be shaped to oppose 
such policies. According to the premises of the theory, a veto by the respective 
actors over corresponding environmental or redistributive measures appears 
quite legitimate.
The only acceptable criterion which allows measuring the actors’ welfare 
externally can be derived from the premises of the public choice theory. It must 
not be one which depicts social preferences, the prevailing tendency in studies 
on common welfare. It needs rather to be a criterion which allows testing to what 
extent stakeholders act against their own interests under unanimity rule. From 
the rational actor assumption in public choice theory arises a simple yet substan-
tial standard of evaluation for the welfare effects of voting procedures. It says: 
“More money is better than less”.
An increase in efficiency, and accordingly a positive effect on common 
welfare, is achieved if the return on investment in a public good improves the 
position of the individual voter. If the hypothesis on the superiority of unanimity 
rule with respect to its welfare effects is to be supported, an empirical analysis 
of the question of which rule creates greater welfare should demonstrate that 
this minimal condition is fulfilled. This means a larger material benefit for every 
actor involved is better than a smaller, no matter how individual preferences are 
shaped to contribute to this result. Should the advocates of public choice theory 
refuse even this minimal condition, it is not clear what gain in knowledge their 
approach could achieve.
With the assumptions presented here we do not intend to make any kind of 
generalized statement on whether policy positions concerning common welfare 
can actually be recognized, for instance deliberatively (Habermas 1992), or evalu-
ated. In our experimental research design such an evaluation is possible, because 
welfare can be expressed in measurable monetary terms. In a corresponding real-
world situation this would probably lead to an argument as to which collective 
goods should be financed in what quantity by this fund. The experimental design 
allows us to ignore this issue, and also, pragmatically, to exclude other debates 
on common welfare: for instance, considerations based on discourse theory are 
not necessary, because we do not test the influence of communication in our 
experiment.
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The subsequent analysis thus only seeks to test whether groups playing a 
public goods game (see below), in which they have to decide the size of the invest-
ment in a public good, invest more or less money (welfare) under majority rule 
than under unanimity rule. We also analyze whether group members voted more 
or less frequently to arrive at an agreement (decision costs).
We assume that the unanimity veto will lead to higher decision costs than the 
majority principle. On this point we agree with Buchanan and Tullock. However, 
we also assume that the openness of the unanimity rule, as it has been portrayed 
in Kersting’s normative critique, does not allow us to predict whether egoists or 
altruists will come out on top of this cooperation game. Because of this, we will 
analyze empirically whether welfare decreases or increases under unanimity. In 
order to falsify the hypothesis on interdependence costs empirically, we must 
demonstrate a case in which it decreases. This led us to develop the following 
experimental research design.
3  Experimental Methods in Political Science
An experiment is a purposeful intervention into the data-generating process 
aiming at manipulating single elements of this process systematically (Morton 
and Williams 2010: 42). Experiments can be run in the laboratory, but also 
in the field, i.e., the natural environment of subjects. In order to test a theory 
 experimentally, the experimenter varies an independent variable – in our case 
the decision-making rule – and observes the effects of this variation in an oth-
erwise constant setting. Experiments thus have enormous potential in unveiling 
causal effects between variables (Kinder and Palfrey 1993; McDermott 2002a,b).
As with all other methods in the social sciences, experiments have certain 
limitations which have to be considered carefully. For instance, confounding var-
iables may interfere with the experimenter’s intended manipulation of the data-
generating process, thus preventing the identification of causal effects. Insofar as 
the confounding variables are observable, holding them constant provides a pos-
sible remedy. However, some variables, like personal traits or emotions, cannot 
be observed directly or with great difficulty at best. In such cases,  assigning 
 subjects randomly to the different treatments of the experiment offers a way of 
preventing biased inferences.
In comparison, when employing research designs relying on field data, 
researchers do not have systematic influence on the data generating-process. 
Instead, in order to test a theory, researchers select from relevant, already exist-
ing data. However, individuals do not act under the researcher’s scrutiny and 
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perhaps not even under the exact conditions relevant for the theory. Lacking the 
ability to manipulate the data-generating process and thus controlling confound-
ing factors, researchers can only select data which appear as useful as possible 
for the analysis. Thus, causal relationships cannot be revealed with the high 
degree of certainty possible in laboratory experiments.
There are different types of experiments in political science. In survey experi-
ments, for instance, the experiment is embedded in a questionnaire. These 
experiments usually study individual decision making which is not the outcome 
of an interaction between subjects. In contrast, field experiments offer a way to 
study such interactions between subjects. However, the experimenter loses some 
control over the data-generating process because the experiment is conducted 
in the subjects’ natural environment. Conducting a laboratory experiment pro-
vides for a maximum of control because the experimenter purposefully designs 
the setting in which subjects interact.
Our study is inspired by the methodology usually employed in experimen-
tal economics. Laboratories used in experimental economics consist of a certain 
number of networked computer workstations. To preserve subjects’ anonymity 
and prevent uncontrolled communication between them, subjects sit in cubi-
cles during the experiment. Most subjects are students of various disciplines, 
recruited online via email, who receive real money for participating in the experi-
ment. The exact amount depends on the subject’s own decisions and the deci-
sions of other interacting subjects (for an overview see Glassmann 2007). The 
payoff scheme thus sets the incentives for the participants in the experiment, i.e., 
payoffs induce individual preferences (Smith 1976). The experimenter sets up a 
game allowing subjects to interact via the computer network. Laboratory experi-
ments can thus be used to study questions relevant for political science, such as 
bargaining or social dilemma situations (Palfrey 2006). Data collected in labora-
tory experiments exhibit a high degree of internal validity. However, critics argue 
that the results of laboratory experiments may be biased because the majority of 
participants are students and hence not representative of the wider population in 
terms of education levels or other characteristics. This, and the artificiality of the 
laboratory setting, might reduce the external validity of experimental findings.
Morton and Williams (2010: 255) define external validity as follows: “The 
approximate truth of the inference or knowledge claim for observations beyond 
the target population studied”. This concerns the generalizability of experimental 
results. However, the question of generalizability is of great relevance in all empir-
ical studies. Generalizing findings on the basis of one population to other popula-
tions faces the same problems regardless of whether the original data were col-
lected in the field or in the laboratory. Even random sampling does not solve these 
problems (Morton and Williams 2010: 264). If the sample comprises people from 
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a single country, results are not automatically valid for other countries as well. 
The fact that subjects in a laboratory experiment are usually not representative 
in terms of a random sample does not imply that experimental results cannot be 
generalized. For example, in a meta-analysis of framing experiments, Kühberger 
(1998) shows that the behavior of students does not differ significantly from other 
subjects. Moreover, experiments comparing behavior in different cultures can be 
used to assess the generalizability of experimental results (Roth et al. 1991).
The artificiality of the laboratory environment also has important advan-
tages. The researcher knows the conditions under which data are generated very 
precisely and is therefore able to describe the limits of generalizability of her 
results very accurately. Moreover, follow-up experimental studies allow varying 
particular aspects later on in order to analyze their effects on the study variable.
3.1  Experimental Design
We design two treatments called Unanimity Treatment (UT) and Majority Treat-
ment (MT). In both treatments subjects play a public goods game (explained in 
detail below). They are divided into groups of three. We thus start with the small-
est possible group size to test the influence of different decision-making rules. 
Conceivably, group size can exert an independent effect on cooperation levels 
in the public goods game, and is thus a potential additional variable of interest. 
Subsequent experiments could increase group size in order to test the effects of 
this variable systematically.6
In our study we focus on the within-group decision-making stage as the deci-
sive level of action. The public goods game is a generalization of a multi-person 
prisoner’s dilemma game (Eckel 2007). In the experiment each group receives an 
endowment of 20 points and has to decide how many to contribute to a public 
good. In order to create a decision situation mirroring Buchanan and Tullock’s 
theoretical considerations, the game has to constitute a social dilemma. To induce 
such a dilemma situation, we created communities each made up of four groups. 
In our experiment the return from the public good depends not on the contribu-
tion of one group, but on the contributions of all four groups forming a community. 
6 We tested the effect of increasing group size on cooperation levels, conducting MT with five-
person groups. Our findings show that cooperation levels do not decline with increasing group 
size under majority rule. Therefore, these findings support the results presented in this study. 
However, we cannot rule out the possibility of the dynamic of group decision-making changing 
as groups grow in size. Such questions are for future studies.
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The social dilemma originates from an incentive to free ride on the other groups’ 
contributions. Such an incentive is absent in a simple group experiment in which 
groups make their decisions without between-group interactions. In our experi-
ment each group decides over the group’s contribution to the public good by a 
voting of the three group members. Individual subjects only act during this phase 
of intra-group decision making. Once a group has reached a decision, it is final, 
and the decision outcomes of the four groups are aggregated automatically at the 
community level. Even though subjects do not act on the community level, the 
existence of communities is very important for our experimental design because 
it creates the incentive to free ride on the other groups’ contributions to the public 
good. The free-riding incentive is further strengthened by the fact that communi-
ties are made up of four groups instead of the sufficient minimum of two.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects receive instructions informing them 
of the rules of the experiment. Throughout, we use neutral language. For instance, 
the public good is labeled “common project”, thus avoiding suggesting a specific 
purpose for it. If we had framed the experiment with a real-world policy example 
(e.g., environmental protection), we would have run the risk of subjects expressing 
individual preferences over the policy associated with the common project.
The game is played repeatedly over 15 rounds. In each round, groups decide 
whether to contribute the whole endowment of 20 points to the project, part of 
it, or nothing. Hence, the contribution of the group i to the project in round t is 
ni,t (0  ≤  ni,t  ≤  20). All points not contributed to the project are automatically trans-
ferred to the group’s private account. The income yi,t of group i in round t can be 
calculated with the following equation:
=
= − + ∑4, , ,
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The income yi,t consists of two components. Firstly, the group receives all 
points from the private account not contributed to the project (20–ni,t); secondly, 






n ). In a round all group members
 
receive yi,t points. The return from the common project is 50% of the contri butions 
of the whole community of four groups.7 Each group receives the same amount, 
7 In communities consisting of four actors, groups have an incentive to free ride if the 
 marginal return from the public good is between 0.25 and 1. Hence, from the theoretical  
perspective the concrete parameterization of this variable does not matter as long as the same  
value from the specified interval is used in both treatments of the experiment. Most  
comparable public goods experiments employ a marginal return rate between 0.4 and 0.6.  
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irrespective of its contribution to the public good. Under the common assumptions 
of rationality and selfishness, an individual group should contribute nothing to 
the project and profit from the other groups’ contributions instead. However, all 
groups would be better off if they all contributed their entire endowment to the 
public good. In this situation the welfare of the community doubles. Monetary 
incentives are held constant throughout the whole experiment. We use a partner-
matching procedure implying constant composition of groups and constant com-
position of communities. Hence, an individual subject belongs to the same group 
and accordingly to the same community throughout the experiment. Thus, in our 
experimental design a community forms a statistically independent observation.
The two treatments differ only in the intra-group decision-making rule. In MT 
group actors decide by majority rule over their contribution ni,t to the project. In 
UT groups decide by unanimity rule. In both, each subject has one vote in each 
ballot. In a ballot, all group members cast their vote simultaneously. In MT, at 
least two group members have to vote for the same contribution to the public 
good in order to reach a decision in a round. If no two group members enter an 
identical ni,t in the first ballot of round t, all group members receive information 
on how the other group members have just voted, and a new ballot is held. This 
procedure is repeated until at least two group members vote for an identical ni,t. 
Analogously, in UT all three group members have to vote for the same contribu-
tion to the project because they have effective veto power. If they cannot reach 
a unanimous decision in the first ballot of a round, the voting procedure will be 
repeated until the group reaches a unanimous decision with all three voting for 
an identical contribution to the project.
At the end of each round, after having reached a binding group decision, 
individual group members receive information about the decisions of the other 
groups. They learn the contribution of their own group and the contributions 
of the other groups in their community. Consequently, subjects also learn the 
number of points earned in the round. A new round then starts. By studying sub-
jects repeatedly over 15 rounds we can detect whether cooperation rates increase 
or decrease in the course of the experiment.8 We expect that the decision-making 
rule will influence behavior over time. For example, subjects receive information 
We choose 0.5 for pragmatic reasons: employing a factor of 0.5 simplifies the calculation of  
profits, and we thus minimize the risk that participants commit computational errors which 
might bias our experimental results.
8 Generally, we expect that the repeated interaction over 15 rounds offers a strategic incentive 
to contribute substantial amounts in the early rounds of the experiment. The incentive to  
cooperate gets weaker in later rounds (Andreoni 1988, 1995).
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about the way other group members build voting coalitions or use their veto 
power.
We ran our experiments in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research at 
the University of Cologne. Subjects interacted via a computer network. Commu-
nication between subjects was limited to voting over their desired contribution 
to the project. We prevented all other ways of between-subject communication 
to avoid any independent effect on cooperation (Ostrom et al. 1992; Sally 1995). 
The experiment was programmed and run using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). We recruited subjects per email using the online recruitment software 
ORSEE (Greiner 2004).9 At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were ran-
domly assigned to a cubicle in the laboratory. Written instructions informed them 
of the rules of the experiment. We used a short questionnaire to test whether all 
participants understood the instructions correctly. In this questionnaire sub-
jects were also asked to calculate the payoffs resulting from several hypothetical 
numerical examples of contributions to the project to make sure that they com-
pletely understood the game’s dilemma structure. At the end of the experiment, 
subjects filled in a second questionnaire asking them about demographical data 
such as gender, age, and field of study.
Overall, we conducted 12 sessions from November 2008 to January 2009. A 
total of 288 subjects participated in our experiment. We studied 12 communities, 
comprising 144 participants in each treatment. Subjects were paid individually 
and privately. Payoffs depended on the subject’s group behavior and the contri-
bution of the other groups to the subject’s community. Subjects received €0.10 
per six points earned during the experiment. On average, subjects earned €10.46, 
including a show-up-fee of €2.50. Each session took about an hour.10
3.2  Results
Figures 1 and 2 show the main results of our experiment. Figure 1 depicts mean 
contributions to the project per round in both treatments. As mean contributions 
and mean payoffs are equivalent, we use Figure 1 to compare welfare effects 
between the two treatments. Figure 2, showing the mean number of ballots 
9 Overall, the subject pool comprises 2700 registered individuals. Nearly all of them are 
students from the University of Cologne, the majority studying at the Faculty of Management, 
Economics, and Social Sciences.
10 On average, a session in MT took 60 minutes, and in UT 70 minutes.
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necessary to reach a decision in a round, gives information about the decision 
costs in both treatments.
Our main finding can be summarized as follows: on average, groups deciding 
by unanimity rule contribute less to the common project than those deciding by 
majority rule. If we accept the premise that more money is better than less, we 
find that groups deciding by unanimity rule produced less welfare, thus bene-
fiting less from the public good than participants deciding by majority rule. In 
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Figure 2: Decision-making costs measured by the mean number of ballots per round.
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communities depart from a Pareto-optimal solution, compared to groups decid-
ing by majority rule.
Our results are in stark contrast to the public choice theory arguing for 
 welfare-enhancing effects of unanimous decision-making. However, we find 
empirical support for the claim that unanimity rule substantially increases deci-
sion-making costs (Figure 2). Required to reach a unanimous decision, subjects 
need considerably more ballots and therefore more time (on average 10 minutes) 
to reach a binding group decision than under majority rule. On the basis of 
our experimental results we can reject the thesis of an interdependent relation 
between welfare and decision costs. On both counts majority rule is superior to 
unanimity rule.
Looking more closely at the experimental data we note that subjects reach 
quite high levels of cooperation, probably for several reasons. For example, the 
return from the common project is 50%, hence providing a strong incentive to 
cooperate. It is not unusual to observe high cooperation rates in the public goods 
game. In the first public goods experiment ever published, Bohm (1972) found the 
same pattern. Thus, while standard economic theory predicts egoistical behavior 
with zero contributions in all rounds of the experiment, experimental research 
has revealed a completely different picture. In the first round of a repeatedly 
played public goods game, subjects usually contribute on average between 40% 
and 60% of the endowment (Ledyard 1995; Sally 1995; Zelmer 2003). Coopera-
tion rates go down in the course of the experiment before collapsing rapidly in 
the last rounds of the game. These experimental findings came as a surprise to 
proponents of traditional rational choice theory because the strong free-riding-
hypothesis was clearly rejected (Sell 2007).
Our data also reveal patterns typical of the public goods game. As in other 
experimental studies, we find average contribution levels to the public good 
constantly decreasing. Starting from 16.56 points in the first round of the experi-
ment, average contributions decline to 9.53 point in round 12. In the final three 
rounds, because of an endgame effect, contributions drop still more rapidly, so 
that groups in both treatments contribute on average only 3.16 points in the last 
round of the experiment (Figure 1).
As the endgame effect probably conceals important differences between the 
treatments, we only analyze average contributions in the first 12 rounds of the 
experiment. In MT, groups contribute on average 14.33 points to the common 
project, while groups in UT contribute only 11.48 points. The difference between 
MT and UT is (weakly) significant (p=0.089; two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test). 
This result shows that in our laboratory experiment, compared to majority rule, 
unanimity rule promotes egoistic behavior. However, further analyses of our 
experimental data are necessary to confirm this conclusion.
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If unanimity rule is more conducive to the development of egoistic behavior 
than majority rule, we should expect more zero contributions and fewer instances 
of full cooperation in UT than in MT. Confirming this expectation, zero contribu-
tions are more frequent in UT (24.58%) than in MT (19.58%). Comparing the extent 
of full cooperation in the two treatments, we also come to the conclusion that 
egoistic behavior is more pronounced in UT than in MT. In MT 40.42% of all group 
decisions result in groups contributing the entire endowment of 20 points to the 
public good, whereas groups in UT reach full cooperation only in 24.72% of the 
decisions. As a consequence, the number of communities able to maintain full 
cooperation between groups also varies. In MT we find two communities cooper-
ating fully throughout the whole experiment, whereas in UT only one community 
is able to do so.
In MT especially, we see that communities which reach high levels of coopera-
tion in early rounds of the experiment are likely to maintain these levels through-
out a substantial number of consecutive rounds. In both treatments, behavior of 
individual group members is heterogeneous. Nevertheless, we are able to iden-
tify some common patterns: Group decision-making in MT is dominated by the 
median player – i.e., the group member whose desired contribution to the project 
lies somewhere between the highest and the lowest desired contribution in the 
group. Hence, we find a moderating tendency in MT leading to medium contribu-
tions. In UT, however, the most egoistic group member has a greater influence 
on group decision-making than in MT. As a consequence, we find a tendency 
towards lower contributions in UT.11
In our analysis of decision-making costs we also find a strong effect 
of unanimity rule, which assigns veto power to all group members. In MT, 
groups need on average 1.73 ballots to reach a binding group decision in a 
round. In UT, however, participants have to vote 5.69 times in every group 
decision. The difference is statistically significant (p<0.001; two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-test). Hence, our results support the claim frequently found in the 
11 The analysis of the dynamics of intra-group decision-making also reveals some interest-
ing findings. If individuals alter their votes during the within-group decision-making period, 
these adjustments are frequently transmitted into a change of initial votes in the following 
round. We observe this behavior in both treatments. Moreover, we find a systematic rela-
tion between a group’s contribution in the current round and the contributions of the other 
groups in its community in the prior round. Hence, individuals in both treatments decrease 
(increase) their desired contributions over two rounds if the contribution of their own group 
exceeds (is below) the mean contribution of the three other groups in the community. As a 
consequence, contribution levels of groups in a community converge over the course of the 
experiment.
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public choice literature that unanimity rule is impracticable for “everyday” 
decision-making.
However, there is some variance in the behavior of groups in UT. Some groups 
reach a binding group decision in the first ballot of a round, albeit fewer than in 
MT. Hence, decision-making rules do not fully determine final decisions, because 
they do not necessarily impose different logics of play on the subjects. The process 
of intra-group decision making also depends on the individual group members’ 
willingness to cooperate. This might differ substantially among subjects. We 
control for this possible influence by assigning subjects randomly into groups. In 
our view, individual willingness to cooperate is a psychological trait describing the 
propensity to act in accordance with the community’s interest in a social dilemma 
situation. Unfortunately, we are not able to observe this disposition directly. 
However, we suspect that an interaction effect between psychological traits of the 
group members and formal intra-group decision-making rules drives our experi-
mental results. In the following, we will describe this mechanism in greater detail.
Majority rule induces a strong incentive for cooperation by generating com-
petition between the more egoistic and the more cooperative group member to 
reach an agreement with the group’s median cooperator. The median player 
can enforce her desired contribution level by just waiting for the other group 
members to adjust to her will, thus diminishing the more extreme players’ 
influence. Hence, majority rule encourages group members to search for a 
solution strategy for the social dilemma situation. Unanimity rule, however, 
assigns veto power to all group members; thus the question remains how more 
egoistic group members use their veto power more effectively to influence the 
outcome of the decision-making process. We think the most likely answer is 
that the indeterminacy of unanimity opens an opportunity space for psycho-
logical factors which promote the development of group egoism to take effect. 
In contrast, majority rule exhibits a dynamic pushing the outcome of group 
decision making towards the median cooperator’s desired contribution level. 
Hence, in MT the formal decision-making institution exhibits strong incentives 
which dampen the influence of factors which in UT lead to lower contributions 
to the public good.
The Pareto-efficiency of unanimity rule implies that groups do not take 
actions putting individual group members in a worse position. However, ending 
up with in an inferior collective outcome is a constant risk in social dilemma set-
tings. So the most striking result of our study is that unanimity rule promotes 
tendencies that move outcomes away from a Pareto-efficient solution. Our experi-
mental findings thus challenge normative claims of unanimity rule’s being an 
optimal decision-making rule because it guarantees Pareto-optimal outcomes of 
group decision-making.
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4  Conclusions
In this study we asked whether unanimity rule can be viewed as a democratic 
norm and whether majority rule must be considered a “second-best solution”. This 
assumption underlies several studies on democratic theory (Luhmann [1969] 1989) 
and decision theory (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 1999). In our analysis we mainly 
focus on decision theory, in particular the concept of interdependence costs as pro-
moted by Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999). This concept allows us to sharpen our 
research question with respect to the trade-off between decision costs and welfare 
effects of unanimous and majority decision rules, as it is assumed in public choice 
theory. While Buchanan and Tullock suppose that the unanimity rule is superior 
to majority rule with respect to its welfare effects, and that in “everyday politics” it 
should only be deviated from unanimity to the extent that doing so lowers decision 
costs, we were able to demonstrate in a laboratory experiment that the theoreti-
cally hypothesized interdependence between external effects and decision costs 
does not inevitably exist. In the laboratory we randomly assigned individuals into 
groups and let them decide in a public goods game how much they wanted to invest 
in a common project. Subjects contributed less under unanimity rule than under 
majority rule. At the same time, decision costs, measured by number and durabil-
ity of votes, were higher under unanimity rule than under majority rule. The latter 
evidence is in line with a hypothesis derived from public choice theory on deci-
sion costs. Thus, in our experiment majority rule created more efficient results than 
unanimity rule, contradicting received wisdom based on public choice theory and 
democratic theory regarding majority rule as a “stopgap”.
Empirical case studies hint at the fact that veto power stemming from una-
nimity rule causes political failure. Thus, in his well-known analysis of the joint-
decision trap, Scharpf (1985) has demonstrated for German educational policy 
and EU agricultural policy that the necessity of obtaining consent at the lower 
level of government, if this consent is to be formed by unanimity rule, leads to 
deadlock and sub-optimal policy outcomes in vertically interdependent decision 
systems. Scharpf rejects Buchanan and Tullock’s assumptions as well: “However, 
I consider unanimity rule as the major cause of the problem-solving deficits on 
both levels …” (Scharpf 1985: 337).12 This view is supported by Conrad (2003), 
who analyzes the effects of unanimity rule in the council of ministers on the 
basis of a case study on the subsidy race in EU steel policy. He concludes “… that 
unanimous voting can lead to unexpected political interdependence and reduced 
problem-solving capacity” (Conrad 2003: 158).
12 Translation by the authors.
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The results of these studies correspond to our insights into the effects of una-
nimity rule. However, these empirical studies have to deal with many interven-
ing variables. This means that reluctance to cooperate among the actors involved 
cannot be attributed exclusively to the decision rule, even though the authors 
claim that this is the major causal variable. Our laboratory experiment allows 
us to control for these intervening variables, which is why we can reliably state 
that the different decision rules are the causal variable for diverging welfare 
effects. However, these experimental results do not provide an argument for an 
overall superiority of the majority rule. Instead, we assume that decision rules 
interact with other variables which dampen or amplify the demonstrated effect. 
Many other variables have to be considered: for instance, communication, group 
size, sanctions available to actors, asymmetrical power relations among indi-
viduals, multi-level structures, trust relations, the time horizon for interaction, 
social norms with regard to cooperative behavior, etc. The result of this experi-
ment should not be arbitrarily transferred to real-world situations. Nevertheless, 
this is not a methodological disadvantage. The experimental method allows to 
control systematically for additional variables such as group size or communica-
tion. Hence, the analysis of democratic decision rules can be put into mutable 
contexts, allowing a precise determination of its causal influence. We believe that 
the experimental method can be considered a useful “toolbox” for the analysis of 
many important questions in modern political science.
What conclusions can be drawn from our laboratory results for decision 
theory and democratic theory? Two aspects appear to be of major importance: 
First, the concept of interdependence costs fails, shown by the observable voting 
behavior in the laboratory; and secondly, these empirical results strengthen a nor-
mative view in democratic theory which criticizes the unanimity rule for provid-
ing an “empty criterion”. While Buchanan and Tullock primarily suspect majority 
rule of potentially leading to political tyranny, we find evidence that veto power 
based on unanimity rule has the same potential. Thus, Buchanan and Tullock 
escape this theoretical argument by their assertion that any alternative draft of 
their model would ultimately be based on an external measurement of welfare 
effects and efficiency. Such a position appears sustainable. However, to avoid this 
problem we introduce the simple ancillary condition that more money is better 
than less. One may argue extensively about the general possibility of specifica-
tions for a common good in a multi-dimensional policy space. However, to assert 
that – in the absence of alternative options for investments – a higher material 
gain should be less valuable than a lower material gain infringes the rationality 
assumption of Buchanan and Tullock’s public choice model. Thus, we have not 
developed a criterion for the normative superiority of majority rule, but we can 
suggest that the concept of normative superiority of unanimity rule fails under 
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specific empirical circumstances. This upholds advocates of a normative posi-
tion that unanimity rule is an “empty criterion” which creates problematic dead-
locks, by providing a further argument for the plausibility of their assumption. It 
remains the task of scholars engaged in normative democratic theory, however, to 
develop a less defensive approach to vindicate majority rule.
Acknowledgements: The project was presented at different stages at the “Experi-
mental Political Science Workshop” (Hanse Wissenschaftskolleg Delmenhorst, 
2008) organized by Rebecca Morton and Bernhard Kittel and the ECPR Joint 
Sessions of Workshops, Workshop on Voting Experiments (St. Gallen, 2011). 
We would like to thank the participants for their comments and suggestions. 
We would also like to thank two anonymous referees and the editorial team 
of Politische Vierteljahresschrift as well as our colleagues at the University of 
Cologne, especially André Kaiser, Saskia Ruth, and Christina Zuber for their 
helpful comments. This work has been made possible by funding from the Fritz 
Thyssen Stiftung für Wissenschaftsförderung (Az. 20.08.0.101). Financial support 
from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research is also gratefully acknowledged.
References
Andreoni, James (1988) “Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments,” 
Journal of Public Economics, 37 (3):291–304.
Andreoni, James (1995) “Cooperation in Public-goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?” 
American Economic Review, 85 (4):891–904.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values 2nd. ed. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1998) “The External Cost of Voting Rules: A Note on Guttman, Buchanan, and 
Tullock,” European Journal of Political Economy, 14(2):219–222.
Bohm, Peter (1972) “Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment,” European Economic 
Review, 3(2):111–130.
Bohrer, Robert E. (2001) Decision Costs and Democracy. Trade-Offs in Institutional Design. 
Burlington, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate.
Buchanan, James M. ([1975] 1984) Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Buchanan, James M. (1998) “Agreement and Efficiency: Response to Guttman,” European 
Journal of Political Economy, 14(2):209–213.
Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock ([1962] 1999) The Calculus of Consent. Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. The Collected Works: Volume 3. Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund.
Conrad, Christian A. (2003) “The Dysfunctions of Unanimity: Lessons from the EU Steel Crisis,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(1):157–169.
182   Ulrich Glassmann  and Jan Sauermann
Dewey, John (1954) The Public and Its Problems. Athens, Ohio and Chicago: Swallow Press.
Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
Eckel, Catherine C. (2007) “Economic Games for Social Scientists.” In: (Murray Webster Jr. and 
Jane Sell, eds.) Laboratory Experiments in the Social Sciences. Amsterdam: Elsevier,  
pp. 497–515.
Feldmann, Horst (1997) “Die Einstimmigkeitsregel als wirtschaftspolitische Norm,” WiSt 
(Wirtschaftsstudium), 10:523–525.
Fischbacher, Urs (2007) “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments,” 
Experimental Economics, 10(2):171–178.
Gierke, Otto von (1915) “Über die Geschichte des Majoritätsprinzipes,” Schmollers Jahrbuch für 
Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschafts im Deutschen Reiche, 39(2):565–587.
Glassmann, Ulrich (2007) “Wohlfahrt und Altruismus – Eine Bestandsaufnahme aus der Experi-
mentellen Wirtschaftsforschung für die Politikwissenschaft,” Zeitschrift für  
Politikwissenschaft, 17(3):785–804.
Greiner, Ben (2004) “An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments.” In: (Kurt 
Kremer and Volker Macho, eds.) Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG 
Bericht 63. Göttingen: Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung, pp. 79–93.
Guggenberger, Bernd and Claus Offe (1984) “Politik aus der Basis – Herausforderungen der 
parlamentarischen Mehrheitsdemokratie.” In: (Bernd Guggenberger and Claus Offe, eds.) 
An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie. Politik und Soziologie der Mehrheitsregel. 
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 8–19.
Guttman, Joel M. (1998) “Unanimity and Majority Rule: The Calculus of Consent Reconsidered,” 
European Journal of Political Economy, 14(2):189–207.
Habermas, Jürgen (1992) Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des 
demokratischen Rechtsstaats. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Heinberg, John Gilbert (1932) “Theories of Majority Rule,” American Political Science Review, 
26(3):452–469.
Hennipman, Pieter (1980) “Some Notes on Pareto Optimality and Wicksellian Unanimity.” 
In: (Emil Küng, ed.) Wandlungen in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaften vor neuen Aufgaben. Festschrift für Adolf Jöhr zum 70. Geburtstag. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Hennipman, Pieter (1982) “Wicksell and Pareto: Their Relationship in the Theory of Public 
Finance,” History of Political Economy, 14(1):37–364.
Hobbes, Thomas ([1651] 1996) Leviathan oder Stoff, Form und Gewalt eines kirchlichen und 
bügerlichen Staates. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Kaiser, André (2007) “James M. Buchanan/ Gordon Tullock, the Calculus of Consent. Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor 1962.” In: (Steffen Kailitz, ed.) 
Schlüsselwerke der Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
Kersting, Wolfgang (1994) Die Politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Kinder, Donald R. and Thomas R. Palfrey (1993) “On Behalf of an Experimental Political 
Science.” In: (Donald R. Kinder and Palfrey Thomas R., eds.) Experimental Foundations of 
Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 1–39.
Kühberger, Anton (1998) “The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-Analysis,” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75(1):23–55.
Ledyard, John O. (1995) “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” In: (John H. Kagel 
and Alvin E. Roth, eds.) The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 111–194.
Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules   183
Lijphart, Arend (1999) Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six 
Countries. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Lijphart, Arend (2008) Thinking About Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory 
and Practice. London and New York: Routledge.
Locke, John ([1690] 1977) Zwei Abhandlungen über die Regierung. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp.
Luhmann, Niklas ([1969] 1989) Legitimation durch Verfahren. 2. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp.
McDermott, Rose (2002a) “Experimental Methodology in Political Science,” Political Analysis, 
10(4):325–342.
McDermott, Rose (2002b) “Experimental Methods in Political Science,” Annual Review of 
Political Science, 5(1):31–61.
Morton, Rebecca B. and Kenneth C. Williams (2010) Experimental Political Science and the 
Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker and Roy Gardner (1992) “Covenants with and without a Sword: 
Self-Governance Is Possible,” American Political Science Review, 86(2):404–417.
Palfrey, Thomas R. (2006) “Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy.” In: (Barry R. 
Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 915–936.
Petersen, Thomas (1996) Individuelle Freiheit und allgemeiner Wille. Buchanans politische 
Ökonomie und die politische Philosophie. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Rawls, John (1975) Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Roth, Alvin E., Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir (1991) “Bargaining 
and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental 
Study,” American Economic Review, 81(5):1068–1095.
Sally, David (1995) “Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. A Meta-Analysis of 
Experiments from 1958 to 1992,” Rationality and Society, 7(1):58–92.
Sartori, Giovanni (1987) The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Part I, the Contemporary Debate. 
Chatham: Chatham House.
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1985) “Die Politikverflechtungs-Falle. Europäische Integration und deutscher 
Föderalismus im Vergleich,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 26(4):323–356.
Sell, Jane (2007) “Social Dilemma Experiments in Sociology, Psychology, Political Science, and 
Economics.” In: (Murray Webster Jr. and Jane Sell, eds.) Laboratory Experiments in the 
Social Sciences. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 459–479.
Smith, Vernon L. (1976) “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory,” American Economic 
Review, 66(2):274–279.
Wicksell, Knut (1896) Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen nebst Darstellung und Kritik des 
Steuerwesens Schwedens. Jena: Fischer Verlag.
Zelmer, Jennifer (2003) “Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis,” Experimental 
Economics, 6(3):299–310.
